article by Feldstein (1976a) (1981,1982, 1984),and Rosen (1978) 
when invokingthe notionofequal mand that equalsbe treatedequally. treatment.Rather,the questioniswhether The conceptarisesmost frequentlyin dis_ one should objectto prima faciereasoncussionsof tax policyalongsidethe more able tax reforms,motivated by concerns frequentlyaddressed concerns for equal_ ofefficiency or distribution, because ofthe ity-denominated as verticalequity incidental, inevitable, and oftenunavoid-(VE)-and efficiency. The structureof able effects of such reforms on the pre-reanalysisisthat each of the three criteria form distribution of income.Violations of has independent significance and must in HE are understood as being measured some way be balanced againstthe others. withoutregard to the originor justifica-(See Atkinson 1980; Feldstein 1976a , tionof the initial distribution of in1976b; King 1983) , come-including, forexample, the possiDespiteHE being mentioned inthe same bility thatitmerely reflects the incidental breath as VE in Musgrave's(1959) and or even capriciouseffects of previous re-(althoughnot by name) in Shoup's(1969) forms. Pioneeringtreatises on publicfinance,HE The thesisof thispaper is that recent had long receivedlessseriousattention work on HE has in an important sense among publicfinanceeconomiststhan VE jumped the gun. HE is now frequently or efficiency, both in theoretical devel-measured and applied even though there Opment and empiricalelaboration. More has been virtually no exploration of why recently, there has been a rapidlygrow one should careabout the principleinthe lng interestinthe concept.An often-cited contextsand in the manner in which itis now being used.Although the notion of it generallyhas been analzyed and ad- [Vol.XLII vanced in contextsthatbear little resem-(1982) has aptlycharacterized some past blanceto thosein which HE isnow being studiesas "ad hoc approachesdefiningan avidlydiscussed. Mosts papers consider-index ofhorizontal inequaityand an ining HE referbriefly tofamiliar remarks dex of vertical equity, and positing a soby Musgrave (1959) or Shoup (1969) cialwelfarefunction givingtrade-offs bewithoutdirectly considering the connec-tween the two[,which] seems closeto tionbetween the original motivations and assuming what isto be analyzed." Yet, currentapplications. even beforeconsideringfoundationsdiTwo problemsarisefrom the failure to rectly, itcan be demonstratedthat traidentify the normativejustification for ditional definitions ofHE areinsufficient currentuses of HE. First, ifthereisno forcurrentuses,recentlydevelopedHE normative basisfora measure of HE, ef-indexesdo not followfrom thesedefiniforts directed toward applyingitare mis-tions, and such indexesare almost cerspentand willleadpolicymakersastray tainlyinconsistent with any reasonable when they are encouraged to sacrificenorxnative basisforHE. These defects are othervaluesin thepursuitofHE. Second, not,however,inherentin the conceptof ifthereissome normativebasis, one can-HE orinthemotivations forextendingit; not properlydevelopand chooseamong thus,the sectioncloses by offering an inmeasures fora conceptand methods for dex ofHE thatseekstocapturethe relweighingit along with other objectivesevant features. untilthatbasisisspecified. Itisnot always possible to be precisein matters of 2.1.Problenw with Simple Definitions of equity,but neithershould ambiguity be HorizontalEquity acceptedwithout completeinvestigation, as in some instancesambiguity can be reMost generally, and most commonly, HE duced and in othersitmay indicate that issaidtorequirethe equal treatmentof deeperproblems remain unresolved.
equals. (Musgrave 1959 (Musgrave , 1976 Atkinson Section2 compares traditional defini-and Stiglitz 1980.) Feldstein (1976a) detionsand recentlyoffered indexesof HE, finesHE forevaluating tax reform:"iftwo suggestingthatthereexistseriousdiffi-individuals would have the same utility culties even beforeone considersdirectly levelifthetax remained unchanged,they the foundationsofHE. Section3 assesses shouldalsohave the same utility levelif the extentto which the persuasiveforce the tax ischanged."In contrast, VE calls oftenthoughtto supportmore recentin-foran appropriate patternof differentiavocations ofHE in thecontextoftax re-tion(inequality intreatment) among peoform can be understoodbetterin the tra-ple who are not equals. (See Musgrave ditional socialwelfareframework. This 1959 , 1976 section seekstoilluminate the connection The notionofequaltreatmentby itself between HE and VE first emphasized by isinsufficient. (Similar analysisapplies Musgrave and to linkthe application of tothe expanded versionofHE thatwould HE to the study of risk.Section4 consid-requirealmost equal treatmentofthose erswhether recentuses of HE can be de-who are almostequal.') First, unlessHE 2 fendedby attributing normativesignifi-istaken to be an absoluteconstraint, one canceto preservingthe statusquo or by needs to add some measure of the degree invokingother theories of justice. Con-to which HE isviolated by any action. cludingremarks emphasize the practical Second,HE appliesonly toequals;itprousesofHE inlightofthiscriticism.
videsno judgment with regardto individualswhose positions are notinitially alike, 2. Definitionsand Indexes of even though the motivationsusuallysugHorizontal Equity gestedfortheconceptextendmore broadly. R,elated to both of these problems,even Itseems backwards to criticize defini-an infinitesimal difference in treatment tionsand indexesof HE beforeexploring beyond whatever range isdeemed "equal the motivationforthe concept.Stiglitztreatment"countsas a violation, while .67. This largejump (ina two-person ofHE thatgo beyond itstraditional def-example,the maximum value of the ininition. Most commonly, indexesmeasure dicator is 2) demonstrateshow the prothe number or magnitude of orderre-posedindicator isdiscontinuous in ex ante versalsor the rank correlation between income levels. Moreover,itshouldbe clear the pre-and post-reform distribution of that,exceptat the pointof the discontiincome. (SeeAtkinson 1980; King 1983 ; nuity,the indicator istotally unaffected Plotnick1982, 1984 and Rosen 1978 ;also by ex ante income levels. The indicator discussed by Feldstein1976a.)Of course, alsohas surprising properties in terms of accordingto the classic definition, these changes in ex post income levels. Until are reallyVE judgments sincethey ad_ thereisa cross-over, SA -SB -0.After dressthepropertreatmentofunequals-the cross-over, the s,sincreasesmoothly which suggeststhat the implicit value as the gap in income increases, with a judgment must be specified and defended discontinuity inthe derivative at thecross-(seeShoup 1969),somethingthathas not overpoint(thederivative jumps from zero been done. toa strictly positive number).'The analThese elaborations are subject to man ysisand indexesof many othershave rey 6 ofthe criticisms applicable tothe initial flected a verysimilarapproach.Itishard definition: Minute movements leadingto to conceive ofthe normativeprinciple that orderreversals count as fullviolations of couldjustify measures with such proper-HE whilesubstantial disturbances inthe ties. initial distribution thatresult inno order reversalare ignored." The basicproblem 2.3.On theInconsistency Between isthat thesemeasures,becausethey are Concerns forHorizontalEquity and based on reranking,do not vary contin-Economic Mobility uously with the magnitude of the effect on each individual (orgroupsof individ_ Beforecontinuingwith an analysis of uals).
the justification forHE, thissection comTo illustrate theseshortcomings, con-ments brieflyon recentindexesof ecosiderKing's(1983)index,which mea-nomic mobility(MOB); the striking consuresaffronts to HE by usinga scaledor-trastbetween analysisofthisconceptand derstatistic (s,) Atkinson (1981) , simply putation. King'sconclusion suggeststhat would considerMOB to be a good thing hisproposedindex allows"horizontal eqin itsown right. Basically, thisview of uityor social mobility to be taken intoac-MOB isthe mirrorimage to recentim-count," withoutnotingthe importanceand plementations of HE. Change from the exclusive nature of the "or"in avoiding statusquo ispreferred (rather than dis-normative contradiction. liked) foritsown sake.Itturnsoutthat The ideathat thereissome connection many pastattemptstoexamine MOB more between HE and MOB has not gone unprecisely have implicitly adopted this noticedby others(Atkinson1980,Plotcharacterization: Measures simply cap-nick 1982).But the notionthat those turechanges from the statusquo distri-writingaboutHE and thosewritingabout bution,which are assumed to be desir-MOB were writingthe same things, just able.
switchingsignsand reversing normative The most obvious, yet most startling positions whenever switchingterminolpointissimplythat,under a varietyof ogy,seems tohave remained quitefarfrom interpretations, HE and MOB are direct sight. Yet thisconnection between MOB opposites. The simpleexample ofa reform and HE measures should hardly be surthatgiveseveryonean equal probability prisingifsome of the simplestmotivaoftakingtheposition ofany individual in tionsforthe two conceptsarise, respecthe income distribution isa massive af-tively, from the ad hoeassumptionofsocial frontto HE and, at the same time,the preferencer, forand againstchanges from maximum possible degree of MOB (ac-the statusquo distribution. This suggests cordingto some measures).This opposi-thatallwho use one measure or the other tioncan be seen most clearlyby exam-when evaluatingproposedreforms are iningKing's(1983)article entitled "An implicitly advocatingone of theseprefIndexofInequality: With Applications to erencesat the expense of the other,alHorizontalEquity and SocialMobility." though thisunderlyingvaluechoicetypIn one section, he offersand exploresa ically remains hidden. particular index forHE. In the next,he claimsto overcome priordifficulties in developing a satisfactory indexforMOB 2.4.Toward a Working Definition of by constructing "a normativeindexalong Horizontal Equity the lines pursuedabove [i.e., in develop-Having raiseddoubts about recentaping an index forHE]. The only difference plications ofHE, theremainder ofthisinisthat itisusual in the contextof social vestigationexamines possiblejustificamobility to favorchanges in the ordering tions. Initially, however,itisnecessaryto ofthe distribution." Thus,he simplyadopts offeran indexwith prima facieplausibilhis HE index as his MOB index,just ity.To avoidthe difficulties specified in changingthe direction of the effect.' Ifhe subsections 2.1 and 2.2,a measure of vihad attemptedto combine VE, HE, and olations of HE must in some way reflect MOB intohistotal equityindexallatthe the number of individualsaffected, same time,the HE and MOB terms would weighted by the degree ofthe effect (i.e., essentially collapse. distanceof movement). Consider This connection isnot as apparentas it might be becauseKing discusses and after(post)a reform.This measure dexes,has been ignored in past attempts sums the (squared)change in distance to motivate the concept when assessing separatingallpairsof individuals.9 the effects ofreform on the distribution of The followingdiscussioncan be simpli-income. fiedby analyzingthe fiveways a pairof individuals can be affectedby a reform. 3. Horizontal Equity and the They can:
Welfarist Approach 1. Move furtherapart (ifinitially unFeldstein (1976a) has statedthat "equal equal).
taxationof equals is implieddirectly by 2. Move closertogether(still remain-utilitarianism and does not requirea seping unequal).
arateprinciple of horizontal equiw' when 3. Move apart from an initially equal allindividuals are assumed to have the position.
I same preferences. (Seealso Atkinson and 4. Move together,ending at an equa Stiglitz 1980 , Stiglitz 1982 In simple exposition.
amples this is oftentrue because what-5. Begin apart,crossover,and end up ever reasonsmotivate a particular treatapart. ment of one individualwillrequirethe Possibility 5 issimply the combination of same treatmentof another individual who others(4and 3)."In addition, thereseems is equal in allrelevantrespects."(See tobe no compellingreason to attachmuch Westen 1982.) Requiring HE would be resignificance to3 or 4,as distinguished from dundant. Yet, in many instances,some 1 or2,sincethe latter pair encompass the incidental unequal treatmentwillbe informer except foran infinitesimal move-evitable. For example, although purely ment at eitherthe beginning or the end. random taxes can be avoided,some ranThis index thus can be seen tohave two domness in enforcement or mistakes in centralproperties. First,inorder toavoid administration are unavoidable,and often the problems of otherindexes itwas nec-significant. In addition, arbitrary distincessarythat no particular significance be tionsmay be necessaryforreasonsof conattachedto startingor ending at precise venience(forexample, not allfringebenequalityor to the cross-over point itself. efitsthat conceptuallyare income can Second, attaching negative weight to feasibly be taxed),and individuals with movements in both directions iscentralto equal incomes may have acted differ-HE. Since unequal treatment of equals ently,so that they may be differentially most clearly violates HE, moving apart (1 affected by a given reform. 12 In such inor 3)must be registered by any HE index. stances,giving weight to HE-underBut ifHE were limitedto being an objec-stoodhere torefertoany disruptionin the tionto moving individuals furtherapart in theincome distribution, itwould solely pre-reformdistribution of income-is in conflict with the socialwelfare tradibe an objection to increasedincome in-tion. 13 The previoussectionindicatedhow equality, subsumed in conventionalno-such an implementation of HE departs tionsof VE. Hence, the centraldefining from its originalmotivations. This seccharacteristic ofHE-and its central force tionsuggeststhat much of the intuitive inpolicyapplications-is thatitalsocon-forcebehind recentconsiderations of HE demns moving individuals closertogether is already accounted for in the econointheincome distribution (2or 4),directly mist'straditional use of a socialwelfare contrary toVE. Note how distant thiscore function, which involvesevaluatingpolifeatureisfrom the original definition of equal treatment of equalsthat most inciesbased on theireffects on individuals'
vestigators abandon after introductory utility.
remarks-a definition that concernsthe 3.1.HorizontalEquity as an Implicit Preservation of equalityrather than opAppeal to Vertical Equity Position to enhanced equality. The next sectiondemonstrates how this aspect of Feldstein's (1976a) major example il-HE, although incorporatedin variousin-lustrates how the intuitive appealof HE TAX JOURNAL [Vol.XLII can be traced to traditional considera-follows. First, considertwo individuals who tionsof VE and risk.He considersa tax are moved furtherapart in the income reform that imposes costsin terms ofHE distribution as a resultof a reform.IRE as follows:1000 taxpayers gain $10 each, willregister some loss, and the losswill at a costof $1000 to each of 9 taxpayers vary directly with the significance ofthe (a net gain of $1000,but the lossesare movement. Thus, the greaterthe increase concentrated). All taxpayersbegin with in inequalitycaused by the reform,the equal incomes and have identical utility greaterthe lossin HE. But, justas was functions. He demonstrates that the un-the case with Feldstein's example, we find equal treatment offsets partof the benefit that HE seems to be measuring justwhat ofthe reform;the greaterthe rateatwhich we are accustomed to consideringunder the marginal utility ofincome declinesand the guiseofVE. HE and VE have the same the lower the initial levelof income, the sortofmeasure (distance-related) 17 forthe lessdesirable isthe reform.But thisre-same sortof change (moving apart)and sultis alltoo familiar. The reform in-both deem itundesirable. creases aggregate income but causes inNext, considertwo individuals who are equalityin the distribution. The utilitar-moved closertogetherin the income disian framework he employs, like many tribution as a resultof a reform.Just as others,is sensitive to income inequality: inthe precedinginstance,our measure of The greateris the lossin socialwelfare HE willregister some loss,and the loss due to the resultinginequality, the less willvary directly with the significance of desirableis the reform.The only differ-the movement. Thus, the more equalityis ence isthatwe generallyreferto thisef-enhanced by the reform,the greaterthe fectunder the rubricof VE, not HE." lossin HE. We again find that HE seems Note that in thisexample the choiceof to be measuring just what we are accusthe statusquo-which isthe centerpiece tomed to consideringunder the guise of ofmost definitions of HE, includingFeld-VE. HE and VE again have the same sort stein's-is clearlyirrelevant to the com-ofmeasure (distance-related) for the same parativeevaluationof the two states. In sortofchange (moving together). But here, particular, ifone consideredthe unequal HE indicates thatthe equityimpact ofthe stateas the status quo and imagined change isnegative whereas VE indicates moving back to what was originally con-a positive evaluation. But what isthejussideredto be the initial state, Feldstein's tification forthisimplication of HE? Exapproach would lead to the same evalu-amples offeredto illustrate violations of ation of each state; in thiscase,the dis-HE typically begin with the assumption tributive effects of the reform would be that allindividuals initially have equal seen as desirable. Yet movement back to incomes,as was the case in Feldstein's ilthe initial stateequallyoffendsHE using lustration as well as thoseofferedby oththe index IHE offeredabove, and similar ers (e.g., Brennan 1971 ,Zodrow 1981 ." indications would followfrom virtually all This startingpoint is hardly surprising other definitions and indexes ifhis ex-sincethe basicdefinition of HE requires ample were modifiedeven slightly." This equal treatment of equals.The separasuggeststhat the persuasiveforcebehind tion of changes intomovements together Feldstein's example is captured in the and movements apart,however, suggests standard social welfare framework that this set of examples has largely whereas hisearlierdefinitions of HE are niissedthe issue. By starting with allbeing inconsistent both with that framework and equal,allmovements are apart;hence,HE with his example.HE would register a loss yieldsthe same verdictthatVE would in from implementing both changes consec-any event.19Itisrevealingthat thoseexutively, while hisexample (and the social ploringHE, in attempting to motivate welfare approach more generally)indi-theiranalysis,have not chosen examples cate no net effect plication ifHE is to have independent othersourcesof riskis exploredin Kasignificance. plow (1986, 1987) . Considerfurtherthis connectionbetween the imposition ofriskand evalua-
3.2.Horizontal Equityas an Implicit tionoftheeffect ofreformson the distri-
Appeal toRiskAnalysis butionof income.Itiswell known that the statistical measure of variancecan be HE arguablycouldbe reinterpreted as used todescribe the probability distribuan expression of concernforavoidingthe tionthatcharacterizes an uncertainprosimposition of risk. For example,a random pector as a summary statistic todescribe tax's arbitrary unequaltreatmentofequals the distribution of some attribute of a iswelfarereducing, even setting asidefor population-e.g., income-after the rethemoment the earlier argument thatVE sultsof some event (even one not emprovidesa basisfor thisconclusion. The bodyingany uncertainty). The frequency random tax and a certaintax on each interpretation of probability presentsa group that raisesthe same revenueS20 familiar connectionbetween ex ante unproducethe same expectedincome in the certainty and resulting distributions. One post-reform state, yet the random tax is can describethe relevantsituations from associated with a lower expectedutility eitheran ex ante or an ex postperspecprecisely becauseofthe riskthatisim-tivewithout changing the underlying posed.
phenomenon-the former perspective is Unlike the purelyrandom tax,Feld-more in accordwith riskanalysis, the lat-21 stein's (1976a)example ofthe reformpro-terwith VE. ducingbenefits of$10 tomost individuals Previousdiscussions of HE containa but a lossof$1000 to a few issimilarin number of cluessuggestingsome connecitseffects tomany realistic reforms.Feld-tionbetween HE and risk,althoughthe steindiscovers, however, that he must claimthatthereisa direct linkagehas specify the degreeof riskaversion(and never,tomy knowledge,been asserted. In the levelof ex ante income)in orderto addition to Feldstein's use of the Arrowevaluatethe proposedreform and various Prattmeasure of relative riskaversion, modifications thereof. Now one might he alsosometimes talksof gambles and question whether riskisreallyimplicated futurerisks. Rosen (1978) and Stiglitz here,becauseitwas clearfrom the begin-(1982)usea random tax astheirprimary ningwho the gainersand losers would be. example. King (1983) notesthathisHE Yet ifan earlier announcement had been index bears some resemblanceto a risk made describing the generaldistributivepremium. Hettich(1979)usesa variance impactof the reform,but not indicating measure to capturethe lossin HE. Brenwho the gainersand loserswould be,fol-nan's(1971)discussion of HE frequently lowed the next day by a revelation of the refersto varianceand relatedcharactercompleteproposaland itsincidence, our istics ofprobability distributions, and the judgment as tothe equities or impacton arguments he uses to motivatehis HE socialwelfare surely would be un-measure resemblethoseoftenused in mochanged. Thus, most government re-tivating statistical measures of disperforms,which have the characteristic that sion.Moreover,he derivesthe resultthat theyimpose both benefitsand losses, can a government choosingamong a variety be analogized, forexample, toa change in oftax sources-each ofwhich affronts HE climatethatresults in substantial bene-to some degree-willalways do bestby fits but imposessignificant losses through usinga combinationof allof them, inchanges in assetvalues.Whether im-cludingthosecausingthegreatestaffront posedby the government, nature,or a ca-toHE. Brennan fails tonote,however,that sino,thereisriskallthe same. This con-thisisprecisely the well known resultof nectionbetween risk from uncertainty standardportfolio theorywith regardto concerningfuturegovernment policyand how diversification reducesrisk.Despite TAX JOURNAL [Vol.XLII such indications, none of these authors with 8. The parent periodically has some suggeststhat HE amounts to another way discretionary income that can be used to of talkingabout riskin a particular con-benefitthe children-by purchasingbooks, text.
sending them to summer camp, taking Risk isa conceptthat economists(and them to the dentist, and the like. As it others)have studiedmuch more carefully turns out,the discretionary income usuthan they have studiedHE. Using the allybecomes available4 at a time, and terminologyassociatedwith risk and un-most relevantpurchases are lumpy, also certaintyinvokes certainintuitions, as costing4 each.On the first occasion, the well as particular measures, that aid in parent decidesto spend the 4 on the child one'sanalysis. In contrast, HE is coming who startedwith 8, thinkingthat such to be associatedwith conflicting indexes treatment ismore fairsincethatchildis that failto provideeven a remotely ac-then lesswell offand the resultingdiscurate measure or judgment concerning tribution ismore equal than ifthe opporisk,ifthat isreallythe basisforconcern. 
Status Quo
The most obviousresponseifone hopes to defend HE measures isto describethis In order to supportmore recent appli-not as a number of separateactionsbut cationsof HE in the contextof tax re-rather as a singleaction:the adoptionof form, itisnecessaryto accorddirectnor-a decision ruleforthe periodduring which mative significanceto the status quo the childrenare cared forby the parent. distribution of income, independentof the This recharacterization essentially treats welfare consequences in the post-reform the situation(10,8)as the statusquo state. After all, HE indexesare measures throughout.But how isthisdefinition to of the degree to which reform modifiesthe be justified? Which "reforms"should be pre-reformdistribution of income.A macombined? Why not allreforms,past and jorjustificatory problem posed by any such future?Note that any such combinations formulationconcernswhy the statusquo would requirea wholly different appliis to be intrinsically -valued, thus sup-cationof HE indexes than has been conportinga preferenceagainst allchanges ventional. Does itmatter how much time in position, when the statusquo was it-passesbetween the periods?Not thatmuch self the product of countless changes time passesbetween many refonns-the throughout history. This cannot be viewed recentsequence ofmajor tax reformsbeing as a mere "definitional" problem, because but one example. Would we feelthe same the very thing tobe defined isto be given way ifthe statusquo, insteadof being directnormative significance if HE in-(10,8), were (100,1)? Or ifthe statusquo, dexes are to be justified .22 regardlessof the income levels, has ariThe issueiswell illustrated by the pre-sen as a resultof theft?Or ifone of the vious example that involved a reform childrenwas extremely sickand needed (moving,say,from stateA to stateB),fol-medical care for five periodsin a row? lowed by a laterreform that had the ef-Should the notionof HE count as a reafectof restoring the initial situation. For son againstrectifying theftor caringfor the latter reform,the statusquo isB, pro-a sick childfirst? Moreover, even if all ducing a double lossin HE from changing these problems were overcome, one still and then moving back again.A more ex-would have to determine which point in tended example reinforcesthe point.Con-the past decade, century,or era corresidera parent raisingtwo children. One sponds to the place of (10,8) in the above childstartsour storywith 10,the other example. Thus, one must determine why No. 21 HORIZONTAL EQUITYitisthatsome pre-existing (ornever-ex-that arguablywere justified given the isting) "status quo" isimportantand then imperfectcircumstances in which they analyzewhat relationship such a hypo-were made." thetical statebearstothe actually exist-Thus, the statusquo as conventionally ing statusquo. definedand as traditionally used in meaEven ifsome of thesequestionsseem to suringHE-which consists oftheincome demand excessiveprecision, itmust be distribution moments beforethe pending emphasized that some sortof answer to reform,and shortlyaftercountlesspreeach isrequiredbeforeHE, understoodas viousreforms-would only by the most a desireto maintain the statusquo dis-extreme of repeatedhistorical coincitribution of income,couldbe assessedin dence be very relevantunder thisprocess thecontextofa particular taxreform.In approach.The appropriatecomparison the literature, such assessmentsare never would much more closelyresemble the attempted.Moreover,thereremains the comparisonof the post-reform statewith questionof the independentweight to be some externally specified distribution, or givento the statusquo.Returning to the at leastresultsthat couldbe speculaillustration, once the parent has evalu-tively derivedtherefrom. Finally, even if ated the relative needs of the two chil-the externaldistribution from thisprodren,theirmerits,relevantconsidera-cessperspective were specified, itis not tionsof equality, and the like, one must clearhow violations ofHE would be meathen ask why and when (if ever)thepar-sured.Arguably,allreformswould have ent shouldmake a different decision than to be prohibited(which apparentlyis indicated by thesefactors on the ground Nozick's (1974)position)-an extremeapthatthe otherwisedesirable resultinci-proachcriticized in note 2, and one in dentally changesthe existing distribution contradiction with priorattemptsto deof welfare between the two children. velopindexesof HE. Moreover,in an im-(Furthermore, recall that,as developedin perfect worldwhere such an absoluteconsection2.4,ifone isto decidedifferentlystraint had oftenbeen violated, itmight on this account,one'sdecisionshould be thoughtappropriate to adopt reforms change regardlessof whether thisinci-thatmade theresulting distribution condentaleffect isinthedirection offurther form more closely to the ideal. But such inequality orfurther equality. VE objects an approachalsohas little todo withreto inequality and favorsequalitywhereas centimplementationsof HE. The status HE constitutes an objection to change it-quo isnow devalued;reformscan increase self.)
HE. These problems are pursued further Another alternative toattachingdirect in the next subsection's examinationof significance to the statusquo would in-broaderattemptstojustify HE outside of volveattempting, inthe manner of Noz-the traditional social welfareframework. ick (1974) , toportraythe statusquo as the resultofan intrinsically justified process. 42. HorizontalEquity and Distributions Thus,the statusquo can be definedas the Externalto the StatusQuo distribution that resultsfrom this process. This gambit, however,is subjectto
The difficulties justdescribed arosefrom essentially the same problems just de-ourattempttogiveintrinsic significance scribed. There must be some prior"status tothestatusquo itself Itmay notbe the quo"from which thatprocessbegan,again statusquo that we care about afterall, raising the foundational problem.In deal-butrathersome otherdistribution thatis ing with the neverending sequence of capableof independentjustification. (A changes that occur in any society, one pre-existing normativelysignificant stawould have to isolate allthosethatvio-tusquo couldbe viewed simply as an inlatedthejustprocessand recompute what stanceof thismore generalclass.) Some theworld would have been likehad those authorsdiscussing HE in the contextof changes never occurred, modifiedby any tax reformin factuse as theirreference desireto accord some respectto actions pointnot the statusquo,but some other NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XLII distribution such as thatexisting ifthe was derivedin a second-best framework idealtax system were in placeor ifthere thatbalancesa number offactors-asis were no taxes .24 Departuresfrom the sta-oftenthecase-it would be inappropriate tus quo would no longerbe deemed rele-to base a measure of inequityon deviavant,and some reformscould be seen as tionsfrom that second-best distribution 25 increasingHE.
ratherthan from the unattainable first Yet any approachrelyingupon an ex-best. ternaldistribution ishard toreconcile with All theseconsiderations indicate that the traditional conceptand measures of HE as embodied in recentindexeswould HE. The statusquo generallywould be ir-be a totally derivative concept, not an inrelevant; socialwelfare-including all dependentnormativeconsideration. To the equity concerns-would be measured extentHE departsfrom such a role, itis solely by reference to the finaldistribu-not onlyoutsideofthe traditional social tion.In addition, therewould be no par-welfareframework,but inconsistent with ticular reason to expectthe ideaof equal more generalnotionsofoptimallyachievtreatmenttohave special significance. If ing any setof statedobjectives. In sum, the post-reform stateis not ideal, there the closer one getstoa plausible justffiwould be no a priori implication following cation, the furtherone moves from recent from the factthatthe shortcomingarose implementationsof HE. Itthus seems apfrom unequal treatmentof equalsrather propriate to considermore carefully varthan,forexample,equaltreatmentofun-iousconcepts ofequitythatappeartomerit equals.Of course, itmight wellbe an im-attentionand developpragmatic meaprovementiftwo "ideal world equals"that surestailored directly to thoseconcepts. were formerlytreatedin a lessthan ideal manner, and unequally,were instead 5. Concluding Remarks treatedequally, by taking the average treatmentthatboth received. But gains
The familiar definition ofHE isinconfrom moving individuals closertogether sistent with attemptedapplications, and are alreadyencompassed in VE and, in more elaborateindexes often produce many instances, by considerations of ef-paradoxical results. In addition, theillusficiency. 26 trations thathave been offered to motiThere alsoisonly a modest connection vate recentimplementations of HE inbetween more complex measures of HE volve preciselythose instanceswhere thathave been developedand an exter-traditional concernsforriskand VE are nallyspecified ideal. To be sure,an index sufficient toexplainthe intuition against of HE such as that suggestedin subsec-the distributive effects that arise. Fition2.4(where the external distributionnally,itisdoubtfulthatcurrentapis substituted forthe statusquo distri-proachescouldbe based upon attemptsto bution)would tend to be positively cor-attribute normative significance to the relatedwith the degreeto which a state statusquo or derivedfrom otherintrinfell shortoftheexternal ideal. But itwould sically valueddistributions. In either case, be more natural(and more accurate) to thecommand forequaltreatmentwas seen measure the degreeto which one failed in tobe a by-product ofthe optimization proachievingthe idealby referencetothe ob-cess,not an independent factorto trade jectivesused in generatingthe external offagainstwhatever normative principle distribution. More fundamentally, even if isrepresented by the positeddistribution. an indexof HE were usefulas a proxy, Itthus appearsthatthe desireto capture such an indexwould hardlybe indicating our intuitive senseofjustice cannotbe met a value to be traded offagainstoptimal by continuedattemptsto deriveevermore achievementof the objectives that gen-complex measures of HE that are not eratedthe externaldistribution. Rather, grounded inthe original motivation of the itindicates the degreetowhich theseother conceptor some otherprinciples that are statedgoalsare being achieved.Finally, identified and defended. to the extentone'sreference distribution In the tax reform contextsin which HE No. 21 HORIZONTAL EQUITY 149 indexesare applied, pre-reformequalsin ment tothe extentitisconnectedto these the income distribution are oftenequalby effects. These and relatedissuesare studhappenstanceor as a resultof undesir-iedin thecontextof assessing transition ableaspectsofthe statusquo thatthe re-policyinKaplow (1986, 1987) . form is designed to change. Post-reform Third, Atkinson (1980) and Jenkins inequality thus may be an appropriate re-(1986)have notedthatin attempting to sult, therebeing relevantdifferences be-measure the degreeof equality (VE) retween individuals thatjustify unequal sulting from a reform,one can be niisled treatment. Much unequal treatmentis, by examining the post-reform averagesfor however,more incidental. Yet,so longas groupsof pre-reformequalsto the extent such inequality isnot capricious and is equalsare not treatedequally. justified-often by the excessive adminFourth,thestatusquo orientation ofHE istrative costor otheradverseeffects of couldbe motivatedby intuitions relating attemptingtoremedy it-thereisno ob-to endogenous preferences-forexample, viousaff-ront to the principles ofjustice thatutility isdeterminednot onlyby the originally offered tomotivatethe HE con-absolutelevelof income or wealth,but cept. Afterall, HE demands equaltreat-changes in that level. 2' The rationale ment onlywhen thereisno legitimate ba-might be that,overtime,individuals and sisforinequality. To be sure,unequal householdsmake investmentsin tangible treatmentdoesraiseconcernsforoverall assets, human capital, and information economic inequality and may involvethe thatare most valuableat a certainlevel imposition of risk(aswhen there isthe of well-being, making unanticipated adprospectof reform that willproduce justment costly. Alternatively, support "windfall" gainsand losses). When thatis may be found in variouspsychological the case,such effects shouldbe identified interpretations of the sourcesof utility, and subject tothe sortofanalysisthathas particularly those-such asVeblen's (1899) been developedto addressthese concerns, original formulation or more recentinterratherthan beingmeasured by an index pretations such as Yitzhaki(1982)-that not designedforthispurpose.
emphasize relative incomes within refer-
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From a practical perspective, it will ence groups. Empiricalevidence con oftenbe usefulto pay particular attention cerningdisparities in offerand asking to the unequal treatmentof equals,even pricesthatexceed what can be explained though the measures offered by HE in-by wealth effects, such as thatofferedby dexesare not of independentnormative Knetsch and Sinden (1984) ,as well as significance. First, totheextentthatequal asymmetric treatmentofgainsand losses treatmentofequalsisoftenimpliedby the in situations involving uncertainty, as maximizaton of any quasi-concaveobjec-documented and modeled by Kahneman tivefunction, unequaltreatmentmay in-and Tversky (1979) , similarly suggest dicatethepotential to improve upon the modifications in the typical formulation existing situation. For example,in much ofthe utility function. Of course, even if ofthe tax reformdebate,discovering vi-different utility functions were deemed olations ofHE entails identifying wedges appropriate to employ in welfareanalythatcreateinefficiency or making appro-sis, theresulting formulation isstill within priaterelativeincome determinations the welfarist tradition. Moreover,the most among individuals thatare necessaryto direct implication of such modifications is determinethe degreeof inequality forap-thatwelfareanalysis shouldnot treatall plication of VE norms.
individuals -particularly thoseat differSecond,violation of HE on a repeated ent income levels-asifthey have the basismight have adverseeffects on in-same utility functions, sincethe function centives. And, independentof the effects itself would depend upon currentincome on behavior, the simpleimposition ofrisk or wealth."These implications, although (orincreasein dispersion of the income arising from justifications forgivingindistribution) isgenerallyundesirable, so dependentweight to the statusquo diswe shouldbe attentive tounequal treat-tribution, are not aspectsof HE as gen- (1976) . Justification forsuch an approach implicationshelps to explain the atten-would probablyreston assumptionsconcerningthe tion the concept has received.It must be fallibility of human institutions, sincenondiscrimiemphasized, however, that these reason$ nationwould typically be impliedby social welfare have one thing in common: They are not maxmzaton in any event.The criticism thatthe side constraint imposesan unjustifiable lexicographic orreasons why HE in itself is valued in any deringand thatthe constraint isgenerally violated normative sense. Rather, each are rea-by making virtually any reform would be lesspowsons why unequal treatment may provide erfulsincethe constraint would typically be satisfied information as to the actual motivations in suchcasesat no-or little-cost in social welfare. It isthe application of the sideconstraint approach for or effectsof a given reform, whether to any change in income or wealththatresults disuch effectsare to be evaluated by a maxrectly or indirectly from any change in government imizer of socialwelfare (who cares about policythatleadstocrippling implications.
risk,incentives, and VE), a politician on Shleifer and Waldmann (1985) have defendedHE the move, or anyone else using whatever "a " constraint on the ground thatitmight assist in addressingthe time consistency problems ofthe sort criteria are justified in a particularcondeveloped by Kydiand and Prescott (1977) . Theyex text.Each rationalemay warrant further -ine thewellknown problemthat, ex post, itisop analysis in some instances,but none guptimaltoadopta completecapital levy,which,ex ante, willdestroyinvestmentincentives. Sincein theirbaports implementations of HE of the sort sicmodel HE prohibits any reform,assuming adher now in use.
enceto HE does implythata capital levywillnotbe employed ex post. (Foran alternative approachtothis problem,see Kotlikoff, Persson, and Svensson(1986 Schmalensee (1984) admits that his generated,forexample, by arbitraryfiator random measure of horizontal inequityis zero ifno two in events,neitherof which would indicatethat oppor dividuals are exactlyalike,yet attributes signifi-tunities are more equal in the relevantsense.This cance to the magnitude of inequality in treatment interpretation of MOB, therefore, callsmore fora diamong thosewho are identical, and insists thatthis rectevaluationofthe processesby which individuals' magnitude isofa different normative orderthan sim positions are endogenously determined beforeand afil,ir differences arisingbetween individuals who ini-ter a reform,ratherthan measurement of the actual tially are different, regardless of how small that ini change in welfarepositions directlyresulting from a tia) difference might be.
reform.In particular, equal opportunityin thissense 'Partof this problem has been noted by Plotnick can be understood as a preferencefor equalityin ex (1982) and Rosen (1978) .Yet Rosen's distancesensi-ante positions, where ex ante refersnot to beforea tive measure has some bizarreproperties-forex-particular reform,but to beforethe processespermitample, a completereversalin the income distribution ted as a resultof any reforms have produced particregisters no lossin HE. Only the absolutevalue of ularoutcomes fordifferent individuals. MOB alsocan the distances, measured beforeand after the reform, be interpreted as a dynamic analog of VE, the idea not the totalchange in distance, is used;his approach being that the greaterthe movement within the insharplydiffers from a directdistancemeasure when come distribution over an individual's lifetime, the there are crossovers, more likelyhighs and lows average out insome man5Essentially, negativeweight is attachedonlyto any ner.See Shorrocks (1978a) overshooting," i.e., movements apart afterthe re 8Compare conditions1 3 (1983,pages 105-06) with form has reached the pointof equalityin ex post in-conditions l'-3'(page 109);equation23 with equacome. This might be viewed as a sortof VE measure tion30; and Theorem 2 with Theorem 3. since,as willbe discussedin subsection3.1,HE and 91tmay be noted that the expressionfor IHE in-VE give the same indications when individuals are cludesthe terms forwhere i-j,but sincethoseterms moved furtherapartin the distribution. This does not equal zero,they can be ignored.Simple manipulation fullyhold,however, sincemovement apart absent a shows that crossover isignoredby King'sindex,and the index alsoplacesno beneficial weight on movements togetherup tothe cross-overpoint. 1,.
(Ay@)2 (Ay)" 'Forexample, Feldstein(1976a) simply asserts that "theintroduction of a tax should not alterthe order ing of individuals by utility level" (emphasis added) where Ay, is the change in income of individual i and latercriticizes one possiblemeasure of order re caused by the reform and Ay isthe change in total versals because it"would be distorted . . -ifthe util-income caused by the reform.One could weight the ities were alteredby a nonlinearfunction"that pre-index by the inverseofthe populationtocompare relservedranking perfectly, not noticingthe somewhat ativeinequality among societies of differing sizes. With bizarrejudgments implicitin such criticism. Feld-thisfinalmodification, thisfunctionis in the class stein's implicit defenseof a discontinuous index is most axiomatized by Cowell (1985,expression59) .See also surprising in lightof his criticism of Rawls' (1971) Russell(1985) difference principle on the basisofitsdiscontinuity. 14iiisisnot tosay thatany particulai measure will Plotnickexplicitly advocatesthe need for distance be separablein that each of the two movements can measures (1982,page 383 and note 17,page 388; 1984 , be weighed without regard to the magnitude of the page 5).But elsewhere, Plotnick(1984,note 7) states other.Rather, my claim isthat the characterofthe that:"Usefulmeasures willnot be concerned between measure-i.e.,whether a movement isgood or bad initial and actualfinallevelsof well-being, nor be and why in instance5 can be understoodfrom how tween initial and finalrank-preservinglevels. These one evaluatesinstances3 and 4. comparisons may alsobe of interest, but they are not "Exceptions to thisgeneralproposition due to diappropriate forassessing horizontal inequity." (Seealso versities in tastes(see Feldstein1976a, Musgrave 1984,page 11.)He never resolvesthistension.Four 1976),offsetting the incentiveto substitute laborfor of thefiveindexesPlotnick(1984)examines exhibit leisure(seeWeiss 1976),ornonconvexitiesin the feaprecisely the character of King'sindex.The fifth, based sibleset(seeStiglitz 19921 are not relevantforpreson the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, takes ent purposes. no account of distance,which he agrees makes itless 12 See also note 11.With respectto the latterinsatisfactor stances,which account for a largeportionofthe un 'There eyxist others as well.MOB may be desired equal treatment that isthe focusof attentionwhen because,as statedby Atkinson (1981) ,"itisinstru-measuring the HE brought about by tax reform,one mental in leadingto greaterefficiency." From this might simply say that the individuals are not equal perspective, MOB isseen primarilyas a symptom of in allrelevantrespectsand thus the conceptof HE, a freelyfunctioningeconomy or as a policyinstru as traditionally understood,isinapplicable. So long rnentthat can be directly manipulated (increased) in as the inequality in treatmentisrationally based on order to improve the efficiency of the economy, either the differences in circumstances, there is no inequity. interpretation being wholly consistent with the traThus, it becomes clear that many of the problems disditional social welfare framework and thus of no furcussed in the text are not in the original motivation ther interest here. This should be contrasted with a for HE, but rather in recent attempts to equate changes decision to place intrinsic value on greater equality in the pre-reform income distribution with inequity,
